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have been implemented by most US states. JSL allows plaintiffs to claim full recovery from one of
the defendants, even if that defendant is only partially responsible for the tort. We develop a theoretical
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by potential tortfeasors is observed, and on how the actions of the potential tortfeasors interact to cause
the harm. We then provide evidence that reforms of the JSL rule have been accompanied by reductions
in the accidental death rate in the U. S. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that the reform
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Reforms to the Joint and Several Liability rule (JSL) are one of the most common
tort reforms and have been implemented by most US states. JSL allows plaintiﬀs to
claim full recovery from one of the defendants, even if that defendant is only partially
responsible for the tort. We develop a theoretical model that shows that the eﬃciency of
the JSL rule depends critically on both whether the care taken by potential tortfeasors
is observed, and on how the actions of the potential tortfeasors interact to cause the
harm. We then provide evidence that reforms of the JSL rule have been accompanied
by reductions in the accidental death rate in the U. S. This result is consistent with the
hypothesis that the reform of JSL causes potential tortfeasors to take more care.
1 Introduction
A tort is an act that causes injury, for which the injured person may sue the “tortfeasor” for
damages. Since the 1970s, controversy about the operation of the U. S. tort system has led
most states to adopt tort reforms (Congressional Budget Oﬃce (2004)). One of the most
common reforms has been modiﬁcation of the common law doctrine of Joint and Several
Liability (JSL). JSL applies to cases in which a tort results from the actions of multiple
parties (other than the plaintiﬀ him or herself, who may also have played a role in causing
the injury). It allows the injured party to recover full damages from any of the multiple
parties involved in committing a tort. JSL has been criticized for encouraging expensive
lawsuits by injured parties against “deep-pocketed” parties who have been only minimally
involved in creating the tort. JSL reforms generally aim to mitigate this problem by requiring
that a party be responsible for some minimum fraction of the blame (commonly 50 percent)
before they can be held liable for the entire damages.
However, the major purpose of tort law is to encourage potential tortfeasors to take
reasonable care.1 An eﬃcient rule will encourage them to take care up to the point where
the costs of preventing an injury start to exceed the beneﬁts of prevention. If JSL is eﬃcient,
then “reforms” are likely to reduce the amount of care taken, leading to an increase in the
number of torts.
The purpose of this paper is to explore the eﬃciency of the JSL rule, both theoretically
and empirically. At a theoretical level, we show that the optimal rule depends critically on
whether there is perfect information about the actions of potential tortfeasors and about
1See for example Cooter and Ulen (2004).
2who the set of potential tortfeasors are, and upon the “technology” that relates the actions
taken by the potential tortfeasors to the harm suﬀered. For example, it depends on whether
the harm could have been averted by either party acting alone, or whether both parties had
to act in order to avert the harm.
If the level of care is observable and parties are liable if and only if they choose care less
than a unique known level of care, then JSL is eﬃcient as Landes and Posner (1980) have
shown. However, if the technology is such that both parties must exert eﬀort to avoid a tort
and the court cannot perfectly observe the amount of care taken, then the eﬃcient liability
rule is one in which each tortfeasor is liable for the marginal harm they have caused. We
show that such a rule implements the eﬃcient level of care. However, such a rule can result
in total liability that is diﬀerent from the harm suﬀered by the plaintiﬀ.
In this case, as Kornhauser and Revesz (1989) have shown, it may not be possible to
implement the ﬁrst best. In general, JSL does not provide eﬃcient deterrence. However, we
show that under the appropriate conditions reform to the rule of JSL implements the ﬁrst
best. This occurs when harms are separable - essentially, the marginal harm caused by one
party is independent of the actions of the other. Our analysis shows that all other cases can
be divided into two classes. The ﬁrst class includes torts in which precaution by the two
parties are substitutes. That is, the optimal level of precaution of one party is decreasing
in the level of precaution taken by the other party. For example, suppose that we have a
contractor and a subcontractor on a project. If the contractor supervises carefully to ensure
the site is safe, then the subcontractor will take less care, and vice versa.
The second class of cases are ones in which the levels of precaution are complements - the
optimal precaution by one agent is increasing in the care taken by the other. In this case,
negligence by either party can result in a large loss. For example, consider maintenance of
an airplane - if any mechanic is negligent then there will be an accident and a large loss -
hence if one mechanic is negligent, this reduces the incentives for the other to be careful as
well.2 We show that reform to JSL in the case of substitutes leads to a situation with too
little deterrence. We show that when care levels are substitutes or complements neither JSL
nor JSL reform generally lead to eﬃcient outcomes. Moreover, whether the overall level of
precaution will be increased with JSL reform (so that accidents decrease) is unpredictable,
and in the end, an empirical question.
In order to address this question, we ask whether accidental deaths in the United States
rise or fall with JSL reform. Between 1981 and 2004, 97,000 Americans died each year from
2This corresponds to the “O-Ring” eﬀect, as discussed in Kremer (1993).
3accidental injuries, and injuries were the fourth leading cause of death (U.S. Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) (2007)). The accidental death rate can be viewed
as a proxy for rates of serious accidental injury. For every accidental death that occurs,
many nonfatal but serious injuries also occur. For instance, in 2001, injuries resulted in 33:8
million visits to emergency departments (U.S. National Center for Health Statistics (2005)).
We examine the eﬀect of JSL reform on accidental death rates using U. S. Vital Statistics
Mortality data taken from all death certiﬁcates ﬁled in the U. S. between 1981 and 2004.
We ﬁnd that in a sample of deaths that excludes automobile deaths (since many other state
laws aﬀect the probability of these deaths) and illegal drug overdoses (which generally do
not result in tort suits) that JSL reform signiﬁcantly reduces accidental death rates. These
declines are concentrated among young children and among the elderly, suggesting that they
are not related to accidents occuring in the workplace.
Moreover, we examine the dynamics of responses to JSL reform and ﬁnd that the eﬀect
of the reform increases with the length of time the law has been in place. We also attempt to
get at the mechanism underlying reductions in death rates by separately examining deaths
in hospitals and deaths outside hospitals. If, for example, reductions in accidental deaths
were driven mainly by improvements in the medical care of victims, we would expect to
ﬁnd greater impacts on deaths in hospitals than on deaths that occur outside hospitals.
However, this is not the case, suggesting that the reductions in deaths do result from greater
precaution being taken. Finally, as a robustness check, we ask whether future JSL reforms
are estimated to have an impact on accidental deaths. If they did, this would suggest that
the results were driven by underlying trends in accidental deaths rather than by tort reform.
However, 2-year “leads” of the JSL reform indicators have no signiﬁcant eﬀects.
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows. We ﬁrst provide an overview of some of
the relevant literature. We next lay out the theoretical model, the data, and the empirical
models. The ﬁnal sections discuss the results and conclusions.
Background
Brown (1973), in a seminal contribution to the economic analysis of tort law, introduced
the idea that the behavior of tortfeasors can be modeled as a non-cooperative game. He
makes the point that a desirable feature for the law is that the equilibrium should be unique.
Landes and Posner (1980) shows that the JSL rule induces eﬃcient precaution under the
negligence standard with observable precaution. Kornhauser and Revesz (1989) show that
this result does not apply in the case of strict liability, and extend these results in Kornhauser
and Revesz (1990) to the case of insolvent ﬁrms. They ﬁnd that in general there is no rule
4that achieves the ﬁrst best.
Segerson (1988), Miceli and Segerson (1991) and Cooter and Porat (2007), building on
the insights of Holmström (1982), show that liability rules that are not required to sum to the
total damages can enhance eﬃciency in the case of strict liability. More recently, Currie and
MacLeod (2008) present a model of JSL reform in a medical setting with procedure choice.
They show that JSL reform in a negligence regime can encourage more eﬃcient procedure
choice. In this paper, we provide a more comprehensive theoretical analysis of JSL reform.
A larger number of empirical papers examine the eﬀects of tort reform. One strand of
the literature ﬁnds that tort reform does aﬀect awards and the incentives for physicians to
obtain liability insurance (for example Avraham (2007), Sharkey (2005) and Silver et al.
(2007)). Both Kessler and McClellan (1996) and Currie and MacLeod (2008) ﬁnd evidence
that JSL reforms reduce negative outcomes in a medical context. Kessler and McClellan look
at elderly heart attack victims, and ﬁnd that JSL reform (the major component of what they
characterize as indirect tort reforms) reduces death rates. Currie and MacLeod examine all
U. S. births from 1989 to 2001 and ﬁnd that JSL reform reduces the number of Cesarean
sections along with complications of labor and delivery.
Accidentals are a natural context for the study of tort reform because most torts are
acts that cause bodily injuries to others unintentionally, i.e. accidentally (U.S. Bureau of
Justice Statistics (1995)), and accidents often result in tort suits. Moreover, many of these
suits involve multiple tortfeasors. Table 1 shows the percentage of tort suits naming multiple
defendants from a survey of state courts conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics. In
fact, Table 1 suggests that the modal tort suit over an accident is likely to involve more than
one defendant, which means that the eﬃciency of JSL is particularly salient in this context.
If JSL reform decreased the level of care being taken, then it would be expected to increase
accident rates, and vice versa.
Rubin and Shepherd (2007) study the eﬀects of tort reforms on non-automotive accidental
deaths. They do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects of JSL reform. Carvell (2009) highlights several
diﬀerences between our preferred speciﬁcations and theirs, which explain the diﬀerent con-
clusions. The most important of these is treating drug-overdoses separately. This is a large
category of accidental deaths that seldom result in tort suits. The rationale for this decision
is discussed further below. Second, following Bertrand et al. (2004) and our previous work,
Currie and MacLeod (2008), we are careful to allow for state speciﬁc trends in death rates
so that we can reliably estimate the causal impact of JSL reform upon accidental death.
52 Model of Multiple Tortfeasors
In this section, we begin with the standard model of multiple tortfeasors due to Landes
and Posner (1980). Tortfeasors may face either a strict liability regime or a regime with a
negligence standard. Under the former they are always liable for the damage they cause.
Under the later, they are liable only if their behavior crosses some threshold for negligent
behavior. Landes and Posner show that under a negligence regime with the rule of joint
and several liability (the JSL rule), there exists a Nash equilibrium in which parties choose
the eﬃcient level of care. They argue that this is an eﬃcient legal rule. We provide a more
general analysis of the ex ante incentive eﬀects of JSL.3
It is well know that under more general conditions, particularly when the negligence
standard is not known with certainty, the eﬃciency results of Landes and Posner (1980)
do not hold (see Craswell and Calfee (1986) and Kornhauser and Revesz (1989)). More
generally, the provision of eﬃcient incentives when there are several agents is known to
be a hard problem. The diﬃculty is that the eﬃcient level of care of one agent typically
depends upon what that agent expects the other agents to do. For example, if a contractor
expects a subcontractor to take appropriate precautions, then there will be less supervision.
However, if the subcontractor is negligent then the contractor may face liability for not being
suﬃciently diligent in oversight.
We introduce a model that highlights the relationship between the actions of the two
parties and the optimal liability rule. Our analysis builds upon the insights of Bulow et al.
(1985), who introduce the idea of strategic substitutes and complements. They focus on how
the actions of one party vary with the actions of the other. This in turn divides the set of
cases into two groups for which the optimal liability rules are quite diﬀerent. We begin by
introducing the model and characterizing the ﬁrst best. We then derive the optimal liability
rule, and compare this rule to JSL and its reform.
2.1 Optimal Precaution
Suppose there are two potential tortfeasors, denoted by a and b, and one injured party. Let
xi be the investment by agent i 2 fa;bg in precaution. We consider incentives under two
negligence regimes. In the ﬁrst case we suppose that precaution xi is directly observable. In
the second we suppose that precaution is not directly observed, rather, only the consequences
3There is a signiﬁcant literature on the eﬀect of JSL upon ex post incentives to settle. See for example
Kornhauser and Revesz (1994). See also Spier (2002) for a discussion of the problems that arise when
insolvent parties negotiate a settlement.
6of precaution are observed. In order to provide a uniﬁed analysis, we suppose that there is
a signal that can be associated with each agent that is denoted by ni 2 f0;1g, where ni = 1
implies that the courts ﬁnd that agent i took an action that contributed to the accident,
and ni = 0 implies that the courts ﬁnd that agent i did not. To distinguish between the two
information cases, we say that agent i is culpable if and only if ni = 1. When precaution is
observable, the negligence standard is denoted by xN
i , and an agent is negligent if and only
if xi < xN
i . If precaution is not observed, then agent i is negligent if and only if ni = 1. For
example, a doctor may take appropriate precaution and still be found negligent. Similarly,
in some cases a physician may provide negligent treatment yet the patient gets well in any
case.4
Investment into precaution determines the probability, pi (xi), that the signal ni = 1. It is
assumed pi is twice diﬀerentiable and decreasing with precaution. Whether or not precaution
is directly observed, the signal ni is always correlated with the amount of harm that a victim
suﬀers. We allow the expected harm to take the general form H(na;nb); and for notational
convenience let Ha = H(1;0) be the harm when a is negligent, Hb = H(0;1) the harm when
b is negligent, Hab = H(1;1) the harm when both are negligent, and ﬁnally H = H(0;0) the
harm when neither agent is found negligent. We shall suppose that culpability is correlated
with an increase in the size of the harm and hence:
Hab  Ha;Hb  H:
The social welfare for this model is given by:
SW(xa;xb) =  Habpa(xa)pb(xb)   Hapa(xa)(1   pb(xb))  
 Hb(1   pa(xa))pb(xb)   H(1   pa(xa))(1   pb(xb))
 xa   xb: (1)
Since social welfare is continuous and bounded above, then there exist precautionary invest-
ments, fx
a;x
bg, that maximize social welfare. With little loss of generality, we can assume
that this solution is unique and that it is optimal for both parties to take precautions (oth-
erwise we are in the case of a simple tort). Before characterizing the ﬁrst order conditions,
we deﬁne two measures of the marginal gain from precaution that play a central role in the
4See Arlen and MacLeod (2005) for a discussion of this point.
7characterization of the ﬁrst best:
t = Ht   H; t 2 fa;bg;
ab = Hab   H   Ha   Hb
The term t is the increase in harm when agent t is found negligent, but not the other agent.
This term is always non-negative. It may be zero in those situations where only one person
needs to be non-negligent. For example, take the case of a substandard building foundation,
discussed in Landes and Posner (1980). In that case, if the subcontractor performed correctly,
or the general contractor supervised closely enough to avoid poor quality work, then there
would be no harm. In that case t = 0. The term ab is the increase in harm when both
parties are culpable relative to when one or no individual is culpable. In the contractor
example we would have ab > 0. In this case, we say that the precaution of one party is
a substitute for precaution by the other. That is, if either one or the other agent is not
culpable, then this leads to a signiﬁcantly lower level of harm.
In contrast, the case of strategic complements is one in which both agents play an im-
portant role in reducing harm; hence ab < 0. This might be the case with front steps to an
apartment building if one party is responsible for shoveling in snowy weather and the other
is responsible for maintaining a guardrail in good condition. If the stairs aren’t shoveled
then someone who falls may not blame it on the guardrail. However, if the stairs are always
well maintained, the owner will have a greater incentive to ﬁx the guard rail.5
Finally, there is the case in which we say precaution is separable - namely ab = 0. In
that case, the harm caused when both are liable is simply the sum of the harm caused when
either is liable (Hab   H = Ha + Hb). We can relate this notion to the optimal level of
precaution. The diﬀerentiability of the probability implies that at the optimum the ﬁrst
order conditions are satisﬁed:






a)   1 = 0; (2)






b)   1 = 0: (3)






5See McCoy v. Monroe Park West Associates, 1999, 44 F.Supp2d 910 for an example of a similar slip of
fall case on an icy staircase.
8Notice that the optimal precaution for agent a in general depends upon the actions
of agent b. Hence, one of the goals of tort law when there are multiple defendants is to
provide an incentive for parties to coordinate their actions. The extent and nature of this
coordination depends upon the nature of the environment in which parties ﬁnd themselves.
We illustrate this by explicitly working out how one party’s optimal care varies with the care
taken by the other party. To keep matters as straightforward as possible suppose that the
probability of negligence is a strictly convex function of care: p00
i > 0.
This assumption ensures that the ﬁrst order conditions uniquely ﬁx agent a0s care level
as a function of agent b0s care level, and vice versa. Let xa = r
a(xb) be the optimal care level
that agent a should choose if agent b chooses xb. This function is the unique solution to the
ﬁrst-order conditions given by (2) and can be rewritten as follows:
f (r






= a + abpb(xb); (4)
where one can verify that f0 > 0. Observe that the term ab determines how a0s precaution
should vary with b0s precaution. If harm is separable, ab = 0, and agent a0s optimal action
is independent of agent b0s. When ab < 0 then the levels of care taken by agents a and
b are complements, that is most of the harm is caused when one person is negligent, with
the additional harm caused by the second person’s negligence being less if the ﬁrst person is
negligent. Hence, an increase in b0s precaution results in a lower probability of an accident,
and hence more precaution by a. In contrast, precautions are substitutes when ab > 0. In
this case, an increase in precaution by b leads to less precaution by a: These results can be
summarized as follows:
Proposition 1. Suppose that the probability of negligence as a function of care is convex,
p00
i > 0, then:
1. If care levels are separable, ab = 0, then the optimal care levels are independent of
each other:
@ri
@x i = 0 for i 2 fa;bg:
2. If care levels are substitutes, ab > 0, then the optimal care level of one agent is
decreasing in the care level of the other agent:
@ri
@x i < 0 for i 2 fa;bg:
3. If care levels are complements, ab < 0, then the optimal care level of one agent is
increasing in the care level of the other agent:
@ri
@x i > 0 for i 2 fa;bg:
Proof. The proof of this proposition follows immediately from diﬀerentiating (4).
Bulow et al. (1985) call case 2 above “strategic substitutes” and case 3 above “strategic
complements” to indicate that the optimal actions of each party depend on the actions of the
9other. These terms were originally applied to understanding how ﬁrms adjust their choices
in the face of exogenous shocks. In our case they help us to distinguish between diﬀerent
classes of tort cases, and to identify how the existing law compares to the eﬃcient law in
each of these cases.
2.2 Legal Rules
In this section, we discuss three legal rules, the rule of joint and several liability (JSL), full
reform or repeal of joint and several liability that results in a regime in which each person
is liable for the harm they cause (full JSL reform), and the eﬃcient legal rule (ELR). When
the levels of precaution taken by the parties are observable, Landes and Posner (1980) have
shown that the rule of joint and several liability results in the ﬁrst best under the assumptions
that the negligence standard is eﬃcient, and that parties know this standard.
The reason the JSL rule is eﬃcient in this situation is straightforward. If both parties
choose non-negligent precaution there is no liability, while if one person deviates, then she
faces the full harm. Given that this is not eﬃcient, it is optimal for both parties to choose
to be non-negligent. In equilibrium there are no cases where only one party is negligent,
and certainly few cases where there is joint liability. Cases involving joint tortfeasors are
quite common as discussed above, and hence the assumption of a perfect and predictable
negligence standard is too strong. However, in this case neither JSL nor full JSL reform are
generally eﬃcient, and we will show below that the distortions they cause are a function
of the characteristics of the accident. Note that the Landes and Posner (1980) result also
assumes that the set of potential tortfeasors is known, which may not be the case. We will
return to this issue below.
We begin with a benchmark eﬃcient rule. Let Li be the liability assessed upon agent
i if she is the only person found liable, while LJ
i is the liability if both parties are found






i2fa;bg denote the legal rule. Under this rule, the payoﬀs for
agent i 2 fa;bg are:
Ua(xa;xbjLaw) =  Lapa(xa)(1   pb(xb))   L
J
apa(xa)pb(xb)   xa; (5)
Ub(xa;xbjLaw) =  Lbpb(xb)(1   pa(xa))   L
J
bpb(xb)pa(xa)   xb: (6)
Following Brown (1973), it is assumed that given the law, agents choose precaution levels






. This requires each agent to choose the optimal level
of precaution given that she correctly anticipates the actions of the other person. The ﬁrst



























































































Comparing these equations with the ﬁrst order conditions for the ﬁrst best given by 2 and
3, one can see that the ﬁrst best would be implemented with a legal rule that set Lt = t
for t 2 fa;bg and LJ
a   La = LJ
b   Lb = ab. A straightforward computation leads to the
following result:
Proposition 2. Suppose that ELR, the eﬃcient joint liability rule, is given by
L

a = Ha   H; L
J
a = Hab   Hb;
L

b = Hb   H; L
J
b = Hab   Ha:
Then the eﬃcient care levels, fx
a;x
bg, form a Nash equilibrium under this rule.
This rule is quite intuitive. It requires that when only one agent is found negligent, say a,
then liability for a is given by the marginal impact of her harm, Ha  H. When both agents
are found negligent, then liability is equal to the marginal impact of negligence compared to
when only the other person is liable, namely Hab   Hb in the case of agent a:
Note that when a single person is negligent liability is less than total harm (L
t < Ht).






b = Hab + ab:
This implies that the eﬃcient rule may be diﬃcult to implement in practice. First, the
courts typically base awards upon the damages that occur, as opposed to damages that
might or might not have occurred. In practice, it would be extremely diﬃcult to estimate
the harm H that would be caused in expectation if there were no negligence.
A related problem arises if the set of persons who could have caused some part of the tort
is large, or ill deﬁned. Segerson (1988), Miceli and Segerson (1991) and Cooter and Porat
(2007) propose a solution to the joint liability problem than involves making each potentially
11negligent party liable for the full amount of the harm. That is party a would pay H;Ha;Hb
or Hab depending on who if anyone was found liable. This rule would provide a with ﬁrst best
incentives. However, if precaution is diﬃcult to observe, then when accidents corresponding
to H and Hb occur it may not be possible to prove that a is a potential tortfeasor. In
many accidents there may be several agents present, each of whom might have contributed
to the accident. However, unless one has concrete information about their actions, it will be
diﬃcult to ﬁnd them liable, and hence strict liability of this form is not likely to be feasible.
Estimating possible losses in the case of no culpability is suﬃciently speculative that we
suppose H = 0 for purposes of comparing the law to the optimal rule. This would be the
case if negligence occurs if and only if there is an accident that leads to real harm. In this
case, the optimal legal rule is:
L

a = Ha; L
J
a = Hab   Hb;
L

b = Ha; L
J
b = Hab   Ha:
When only one individual is found negligent, this corresponds to the standard legal rule of
holding that person liable for total harm. When both are found negligent, then liability
is equal to the marginal consequence of each person’s negligence given that the other is
negligent, which as we discuss above, may be greater or less than the total harm by the
amount ab, the degree of substitutability or complementarity in precaution.






b = (1   )Hab;
where Lt is liability to agent t when she alone is negligent, and L
t is her liability when both
potential tortfeasors are negligent (with the convention that agent a faces  fraction of the
costs and agent b faces (1   ) fraction of the costs). Let L() denote this legal rule.
Landes and Posner (1980) observe that from the ex ante perspective, JSL can be viewed
as determining the probability that one party or the other is found liable for the full damages.
Letting JSL denote this parameter, then its value is determined by who is likely to be most
able to pay an award. For example, suppose there is an accident during surgery where a is
the surgeon and b is the nurse/hospital.6 In this case the hospital is the “deep pocket” and
6Since the nurse is a hospital employee then the hospital would be liable for harm caused by the nurse
via the doctrine of vicarious liability that makes employers responsible for the torts of their employees. See
12we can suppose that ex ante parties expect JSL = 0. In general this rule is not eﬃcient
because a has no incentive to take care. The question then is whether or not reform to JSL
would enhance eﬃciency?
To address this question we begin by deriving the eﬃcient sharing rule under the hy-
pothesis that each party chooses precaution to maximize their utility given the sharing rule.
This can be found by maximizing social welfare subject to the constraint that each person’s
precaution satisﬁes the ﬁrst order conditions for an optimal choice:
maxxa;xb;SW(xa;xb)
subject to:
@Ut(xa;xbjL())=@xt = 0 ; t 2 fa;bg:
Here we are assuming that given the legal rule L() the ﬁrst order conditions characterize
the Nash equilibrium. Let us further assume that there is an interior optimal choice for .
Under these assumptions the ﬁrst order conditions for the optimal legal rule and level of
precaution are as follows:
Proposition 3. If the eﬃcient legal rule L() is an interior solution (  2 (0;1)) then the
optimal precaution fx
a ;x









Proof. Observe that we can deﬁne a new payoﬀ for each agent in the following form that
will yield the same ﬁrst order conditions (7) and (8):
U
0
a = SW(xa;xb) + papb ((1   )Hab   Hb);
U
0
b = SW (xa;xb) + papb (Hab   Ha):
Using this deﬁnition, the Lagrangian for the optimization problem is given by:
L = SW + a (SWa + p
0
apb ((1   )Hab   Hb)) + b (SWb + pap
0
b (Hab   Ha)):
Arlen and MacLeod (2005).
13Under the assumption of an interior solution for  it must be the case that:
a ( p
0
apb) + b (pap
0
b) = 0:
Let  = ap0
apb and we can rewrite the Lagrangian as:












At the optimum the second term is zero, which gives us our result.
Notice that in the case of separable harm, ab = 0, and  = Ha
Hab =
Hab Hb
Hab , in which
case the ﬁrst best is achieved. In this case, when both defendants are found negligent then
the optimal division rule, , has each agent paying their share of the total harm. This rule
is consistent with reform to the JSL rule. For example, in environments where JSL is 1
or 0, and both agents make similar contributions to the harm, then JSL reform enhances
eﬃciency - it would reduce the precaution by the agent with the deep pocket, while increasing
the precaution taken by the other party.
This prediction is consistent with the evidence in Currie and MacLeod (2008), who ﬁnd
that in the case of medical malpractice, reform to JSL results in physicians taking more
precaution. In that case the hospital would normally be the deep pocket, and hence JSL
reform would lead to more liability for the physicians. Under this reform the courts divide
the harm when both parties are liable.
When harm is not separable, then no division rule results in the ﬁrst best, and the nature
of the accident determines the nature of the distortion. In the famous Hunters case (Summers
v. Tice 199 P.2nd 1 (Cal. 1948)), one hunter was shot in the eye by another hunter. The
problem was that the two hunters shot in the same direction, at the same time. Hence it was
not clear who caused the damage, and whether either of them would be liable. We can view
pi(xi) as the probability that the hunter shot in the direction of the plaintiﬀ and hence is
potentially negligent. Let q be the ex ante probability that the plaintiﬀ is hit by a negligent
hunter, and let H1 be the damages if hit by a single shot, and H2 is the hypothetical harm
that would have been suﬀered if the hunter had been hit by two shots. Under this scenario
we have H = 0, Ha = Hb = qH1 and Hab = 2q(1   q)H1 + q2H2.
Hence, the optimal liability rule L
i = qH1 would be implemented by having the defendant
pay H1 whenever one hunter is negligent and there is a hunting accident. Suppose now that
both hunters are found negligent - namely both could have caused the accident. If harm is
14separable then H2 = 2H1, that is, if the injured party is shot twice the damages are twice
as large. In this case, the eﬃcient rule is:
L
J
i = Hab   Hi









This rule can be implemented by having each hunter pay H1=2 if there is only one shot, and
H1 if the plaintiﬀ is hit twice. This is exactly the ruling that was eventually reached in the
US courts - namely the damages were split between the two defendants equally.
Now consider what would happen if being shot twice led to greater complications. In
that case H2 > 2H1 since ab > 0, and hence precautions are strategic substitutes. The
optimal liability in the case of a joint tort would be:
L
J




In this case, at the optimal rule each hunter would pay H1 + ab if the plaintiﬀ were shot
twice. Under JSL if one agent is known to have a deep pocket, then she will face the full
loss, and will therefore over invest in precaution, while the other party will under invest.
However, under JSL reform the damages would be split between the two parties to yield
damages to party i of H1 + ab=2 if the hunter is shot twice. Thus precaution will be too
low under JSL reform.
In the case of strategic complements, we have ab < 0 (H2 < 2H1). This case might
correspond to harm from a small gauge shotgun, where the injuries are minor, but there is a
cost of going to the hospital for treatment. In that case, JSL reform would result in damages
of H2=2 that are greater than the eﬃcient level of damages, H2   H1. In this case we get
excessive precaution, but again JSL does not do any better, and in this symmetric case it
must do strictly worse.
These results are summarized in Chart 1 for the case in which Ha = Hb and pa(x) = pb(x),
and hence both parties have equal weight. We assume that under JSL party a would be
responsible for the full award. In all cases, if there is a single person found negligent damages
are LI = Ha = Hb: Note that under JSL we have that LJ
a = Hab > Hab   Ha > 0 = LJ
b and
hence JSL always yields too high precaution for a and too low for b. All that changes in the
diﬀerent cases is the liability each person faces when they are both liable. The eﬀects on the
level of precaution taken can be summarized as follows.
15Environment Eﬃcient Solution (LJ) JSL Reform (LJ) JSL (LJ
a;LJ
b)
Observable Precaution eﬃcient eﬃcient eﬃcient
Substitutes (ab > 0) eﬃcient low excessive (a) and low (b)
Separable (ab = 0) eﬃcient eﬃcient excessive (a) and low (b)
Complements (ab < 0) eﬃcient high excessive (a) and low (b)
Chart 1: Eﬀect of Liability Rules on Precaution
In the case of substitutes, precaution by both agents falls as we go from the eﬃcient
solution to JSL reform. Under JSL person a takes an excessive amount of precaution, while
person b takes less than the eﬃcient level of precaution. In the separable case JSL reform
implements the eﬃcient solution, while under JSL either b takes too little precaution or
a takes an excessive amount of precaution. Finally, in the case of complements there is
excessive precaution under JSL reform, while JSL again leads to a divergence in the amount
of precaution taken by the two parties.
Hence, JSL reform may result in greater precaution being taken in some cases, though
this is not necessarily eﬃcient. Eﬃciency does not necessarily entail more precaution -
it really depends upon the accident technology. Notice that JSL tends to enhance the
precaution taken by the “deep pockets” agent while lowering the other agent’s incentive to
take precaution. Deep pockets are typically large organizations. If they are eﬃcient providers
of precaution, then we would expect JSL reform to lead to more accidents.
However, notice that under JSL reform, a wealthy tortfeasor can reduce liability by
providing evidence that other individuals were responsible as well. Even if these persons are
judgment proof, they could be asked to provide evidence and possibly to appear in court.
This would impose a cost upon them, and lead to more precaution by these individuals even
though they are judgment proof. If tort reform is found to enhance deterrence, then this
would be consistent with the hypothesis that wealthy tortfeasors do not necessarily fully
internalize the costs and beneﬁts from deterrence.
3 Data
Data on tort reforms come from the data base described in Currie and MacLeod (2008).
This data base incorporates information from the American Tort Reform Association Record,
McCullough, Campbell and Lane’s “Summary of U. S. Medical Malpractice Law,” and Ronen
16Avraham’s “Database of State Tort Law Reforms” (Avraham (2006)). The text of each
statute and court case enacting, modifying, repealing, or striking down a tort reform was
located and examined using Westlaw and Lexis-Nexis in order to either verify or correct
the information on the presence and characteristics of tort reforms in U.S. states from these
previously existing data bases of state tort reforms. For the current project, the data base
was extended by incorporating information from 1981-1984. Errors in previous data bases
about tort reform might account for some of the disparate ﬁndings in the literature (see
Congressional Budget Oﬃce (2004)).
Table 2 shows which states and years had any JSL reform. The indicator is equal to one
if there is any new rule stating that a party had to be responsible for a certain minimum
fraction of the harm suﬀered before he or she could be held liable for 100% of the damages.
We obtained similar results to those reported below if we used an alternative measure of JSL
reform deﬁned as a change in which a tortfeasor had to be responsible for at least 50% of
the harm in order to be assessed 100% of the damages.7
Table 2 shows that JSL reform was largely concentrated in the period from 1985 to 1992,
and that there is considerable variation across states. Other tort reforms took place over a
somewhat longer period, as shown in Appendix Table 1. In what follows, we will insure that
the estimated eﬀects of JSL are not driven by other tort reforms that occurred at roughly
the same time period.
Data on accidental deaths come from the National Vital Statistics Mortality ﬁles for
1981-2004. These ﬁles include data collected from all death certiﬁcates ﬁled in the United
States. We divide data on accidental deaths (those due to unintentional injuries) into three
groups: automotive deaths, fatal overdoses on illegal drugs and abused pharmaceuticals, and
all others.
Our main focus is on the third category. Automotive accidents have been the focus of
many other state laws such as those for no-fault auto insurance, mandatory auto insurance,
and penalties for drunk driving (Landes (1982), Chaloupka et al. (1993), and Cohen and
Dehejia (2004)). Drug overdoses are treated separately because they seldom result in tort
suits, and hence may not be greatly aﬀected by tort law.8 Drug overdoses may also be
7 The lowest cutoﬀ was a reform Texas enacted in 1988, which had a cutoﬀ of only 10%, although Texas
raised its cutoﬀ point to 50% in 1995, strengthening the earlier reform. Minnesota is the only other state
that had a cutoﬀ below 25% (a threshold of 15% was adopted in 1989 and raised to 50% in 2004). Hawaii
(1987) and Illinois (1987-1994, 1998-present) are the only states with a 25% cutoﬀ. Four states adopted
rules eliminating JSL in cases in which the plaintiﬀ is partially responsible for the harm, but not otherwise:
Georgia(1988), Michigan (1987, changed to a full repeal of JSL in 1996), Nevada (1988), and Washington
(1987).
8 A careful search of Westlaw shows that there are in fact a few tort cases involving drug overdoses. For
17strongly aﬀected by drug control policies and policing (Becker et al. (2006)).
Rates are constructed by dividing the number of deaths with the U.S. Census Bureau’s
estimates of state population in each year (U.S. Bureau of the Census (2009)). Figure 1 shows
that the three categories of accidental deaths show quite diﬀerent trends. In particular, drug
overdoses have been rising over time, which tends to drive the rate for all accidents upwards
after 1992. In contrast, the “other” category we focus on shows a continuous decline over the
entire 1981-2004 period. The consquence of excluding drug overdoses is illustrated in ﬁgure
2.
The most common types of accidents in the “other” category are falls (25:1%), drownings
(10:0%), suﬀocations (10:4%), ﬁres and burns (9:4%), other transportation related accidents
(5:1%), poisonings (2:8%), and accidental ﬁrearm injuries (2:8%) (U.S. Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) (2007)). These types of accidents frequently result in tort
suits. For instance, McFarland and Weissenberger (2001) state that the “slip and fall” case
is the most common type of premises liability tort suit (page 177).
Data on additional time varying state-level control variables come from various sources.
These include: data on the fraction elderly and under 5 as well as data on the fraction of
young males taken from the Census; unemployment rates (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
(2009b)); per capita real personal income (U.S. Department of Commerce (2009); U.S. Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics (2009a)); per capita alcohol consumption (U.S. National Institutes
of Health (2009)); and hospital beds per capita (U.S. Department of Health and Human Re-
sources (2006)). These variables were chosen as controls because they might aﬀect accidental
death rates independently of tort laws.9
Table 3 shows that there are about 20 accidental deaths per 100,000 persons in the ﬁrst
two categories, and about 17 accidental deaths per 100,000 in the third category. Table 3
also shows that deaths in this latter category are quite concentrated in the very young, and
especially, in the elderly. Among individuals 65 and above, the “other accidents” death rate
example, in Cook v. Kendrick (931 So. 2d 420, LA. App. 2 Cir. , 2006) a defendant host was found liable for
20% of the harm from an overdose because they did not make a reasonable eﬀort to seek medical attention.
However, the number of such cases is very small relative to the number of reported cases for accidents such
as falls and drownings. Moreover, for other types of accidental deaths, there exist numerous reports, such
as a number of reports from the American Law Reports series, summarizing lawsuits over these types of
accidents. No such report exists for drug overdoses, probably because these deaths are so rarely the subject
of tort suits.
9We use the same control variables as Rubin and Shepherd (2007) to deal with the variation in accidental
death rates by demographic groups, the relationship between accident victims’ incomes and employment
status and the size of any economic damages from accidents, and possibly the willingness to bring tort suits
(Burstin et al. (1993)). The alcohol variable is included because it often plays a role in accidents.
18is 67 per 100,000. Table 3 also breaks out death rates for state-years with and without JSL
reform. A comparisons of columns 2 and 3 shows that states and years with JSL reform
tended to have lower death rates, particularly when auto accidents and drug overdoses are
excluded. Moreover, death rates are particularly lower for the elderly, who account for a
large share of accidental deaths. However, state-years with JSL reform also tend to have
higher per capita personal income, a lower percentage of African-Americans, and lower per
capita alcohol consumption, characteristics that would be expected to be associated with
lower death rates in the absence of JSL reform.
4 Econometric Model
The theoretical model developed above suggests that the eﬀect of JSL reform on accident
rates is very much an empirical matter. The answer depends on both the extent to which
the care taken is observable, and on the “technology” relating care to potential harms. Table
2 showed that there is considerable variation in the adoption of JSL reform across U.S. states
and years. Our empirical model uses this variation to identify the eﬀect of JSL reform on
accident rates in a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences framework.
Our main econometric model is the following:
ln(RATEst) = a + b1JSLst + b2xV ARst + b3Y EARt
+b4STATEs + b5STATEs  TIME + st; (10)
where s and t denote states and years, respectively. RATE denotes a rate (per 100,000
state residents) of accidental deaths. Taking the natural logarithm of the RATE allows us
to interpret the eﬀects of the right hand side variables as percentage changes. JSL is an
indicator for any JSL reform, XVAR is the vector of other state characteristics described
above, STATE is a vector of state indicators, and STATE*TIME indicates that we are
allowing a separate time trend for each state. State-speciﬁc time trends control for possible
gradual changes in omitted factors within states, such as changes in awareness about safety
issues.10
10 Carvell (2009) shows that estimates from models without time trends are often implausible. For example,
2-year “leads” of some tort reform variables are statistically signiﬁcant in models that exclude the time trends,
but not in models that include them, suggesting that time trends really do provide a correction for omitted
variables.
19We ﬁrst estimate equation (10), and then test the robustness of our estimates to including
controls for the other tort reforms shown in Appendix Table 1. We estimate the model for
the three categories of accidental deaths (auto, drug overdoses, and other) separately. We
predict that state-level JSL reform should have no impact on deaths due to auto accidents
or drug overdoses, so if we found an “eﬀect” of JSL reform on these deaths, it might suggest
that an omitted variable correlated with JSL reform was driving the estimates. Alternatively,
if we found an eﬀect of JSL reform on all accidental death rates, it might suggest that the
reform acted by causing medical practitioners to treat accident victims with more care, rather
than by preventing accidents. We also estimate (10) separately by age in view of the large
diﬀerences in death rates across age groups.
We estimate a second model that asks whether the eﬀects of JSL reforms change as time
passes:
ln(RATEst) = a + b1JSL_NEWst + b2JSL_OLDst + b3XV ARst +
b4Y EARt + b5STATEs + b6STATEs  TIME + "st: (11)
It might be the case that older reforms have more impact, since parties will have had
more opportunity to learn about the law and to adjust their behaviors in response to the
legal change (Kessler and McClellan (1996)). JSL_NEW is an indicator equal to one if
the reform was enacted within the last N years, where, in successive models, N takes on the
values 2, 3, 4, or 5. JSL_OLD is an indicator equal to one if the law has been in place for
more than N years. Kessler and McClellan (1996), Kessler and McClellan (2002b), Kessler
and McClellan (2002a), Kessler et al. (2005), and Born et al. (2009) adopt a similar approach
to investigating the dynamic eﬀects of tort reforms.
As a ﬁnal robustness check, we estimate:
ln(RATEst) = a + b1JSLst + b2JSL_LEADst + b3XV ARst
+b4Y EARt + b5STATEs + b6STATEs  TIME + st: (12)
This regression includes an indicator equal to one in the two years preceding JSL reform.
If JSL reform reﬂects underlying trends in the state, and these trends also inﬂuence the
accidental death rate, then we may ﬁnd that these “leads” are statistically signiﬁcant.
All of the regressions are weighted by population in each state and year. Standard errors
20are clustered by state, which allows for arbitrary forms of serial correlation and heteroscedas-
ticity in the error terms.
5 Empirical Results
Estimates of equation (10) are shown in Table 4. The ﬁrst column shows that JSL reform
reduces the non-auto, non-overdose accidental death rate by 2:8%. The numbers in Table 2
imply that there are 51,721 deaths per year of this type, so universal JSL reform would avert
1,433 deaths per year. The estimates shown in columns 2 and 3 show that controlling for
other prominent tort reforms only increases the estimated eﬀect of JSL reform. For example,
the column 3 estimate of -0:0336 implies that 1,738 deaths per year could be averted. The
other tort reforms considered include reform of the Collateral Source Rule (CSR), caps on
non-economic damages (“pain and suﬀering”), and changes to punitive damage rules.11
Of these other tort reforms, only changes to CSR have an impact. Most reforms to
the CSR state that the damages a tortfeasor pays to the victim must be reduced by the
amount of any payments the victim has already received, such as payments from insurance
companies. Thus, these reforms directly reduce the amount a potential tortfeasor can expect
to pay. Table 4 suggests that reforms to CSR encourage potential tortfeasors to take less
care, with a resulting increase in fatal accidents. The magnitude of the eﬀect is large enough
to largely oﬀset the positive eﬀect of JSL reforms.
Caps on non-economic damages (whether they are general caps or only applicable to
cases of medical malpractice) are also intended to limit payouts by tortfeasors, but have
little impact on accidental deaths. We included caps on non-economic damages applying in
medical malpractice cases only separately because tort reforms might aﬀect death rates not
by preventing accidents but by increasing the supply of physicians and/or other medical care
providers who provide treatment of accident victims, thereby enabling more accident victims
to survive their injuries (Rubin and Shepherd (2007) and Kessler et al. (2005)). However,
we ﬁnd little evidence that this is the case.
This conclusion is strengthened by the estimates for accidental deaths due to overdoses
and auto accidents which are shown in columns 4 through 7. We ﬁnd no eﬀects of JSL or
any other tort reform on deaths due to these causes. Hence, it is unlikely that the eﬀect of
11Changes to punitive damages rules can take the form either of caps on punitive damages, or adoption of
a higher evidence standard in punitive damages cases. The higher standard is that there must be clear and
convincing evidence, rather than merely a preponderance of evidence, that the defendant’s conduct justiﬁes
punitive damages.
21tort reform is being driven by changes in the behavior and/or supply of medical providers
who care for accident victims. Rather, it appears that JSL reform is aﬀecting accidental
death rates by preventing accidents that would otherwise lead to death. As an additional
check on this hypothesis, we estimate models for deaths that occur outside hospitals only.
These account for about 40% of deaths over our sample period. Column 8 of Table 4 shows
that the eﬀects of JSL reform are similar for deaths that occur outside of hospitals, which
presumably are little inﬂuenced by changes in medical practice within hospitals.
Table 5 presents estimates of equation (10) by age. While it is diﬃcult to get at the
eﬀects of tort reform on underlying causes of accidental death, these estimates are highly
suggestive. We ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects of JSL reform only on the very young (children aged
zero to ﬁve) and on those 65 or over. The point estimates for school-aged children are non-
negligible, but they are not precisely estimated. However, the point estimate for working-
aged people is very small and insigniﬁcant. Hence, there is little evidence that JSL reform
causes employers to take more care in order to avoid employee injury. Perhaps incentives
provided by the Workman’s Compensation System, direct regulation of workplace safety,
and/or by the diﬃculty of replacing injured employees are more important than the tort
system when it comes to accidents on the job.
It is also suggestive that we ﬁnd eﬀects of CSR reform only for the elderly. This group
may be the most likely to have alternative payers such as Medicare and other insurance
companies whose payouts would have to be set against any damages that could be collected
by the victim’s families.
The estimates suggest that JSL reform in every state would prevent between 127 and
135 accidental deaths per year in young children, but as many as 1033 to 1146 deaths per
year among the elderly. Conversely, CSR reform increases deaths among the elderly by an
oﬀsetting amount. This concentration of eﬀects among the elderly suggests that on average
tort reforms reduce accidental deaths by encouraging people like landlords to take more care
to prevent accidents (like falls) that may have fatal consequences among the elderly.
Estimates of equation (11) are shown in Table 6. These estimates contrast the eﬀects of
recently enacted reforms to those that have been in place for some time. The time window
for a new reform varies from 2 years in column 1 to 5 years in column 4. Table 6 demonstrates
that a new JSL reform has a larger eﬀect when it has been in place longer. For example,
reforms that have been enacted within the last two years reduce accident rates by 2.09%
while those enacted within the last 5 years reduce accident rates by 2.94%. The second row
of the table shows that JSL reforms that have been in place for longer periods have larger
22eﬀects. For example, reforms that have been in place for more than 5 years reduce accident
rates by 4.57%.
In contrast, estimates shown in Appendix Table 2 show once again that CSR is the only
other tort reform that has a consistently signiﬁcant eﬀect. In contrast to the dynamic pattern
for JSL reform, the estimates indicate that recent CSR reforms have larger eﬀects, but that
reforms that have been in place for more than four or ﬁve years no longer have an impact.
Finally, Table 7 shows our estimates of equation (12). An indicator for the two year “lead”
of the JSL reform is included in addition to the JSL reform variable in these regressions;
the estimates shown in column (2) of Table 7 also include the leads of the other tort reform
variables as well as the other tort reform variables themselves. These lead terms are never
statistically signiﬁcant, which suggests that the estimated eﬀects of JSL (and CSR) reform
are not driven by underlying trends in unobserved variables.
6 Discussion
We present a theoretical model showing that the legal rule that implements the socially
eﬃcient outcome in the case of multiple tortfeasors depends on whether there is uncertainty
about whether a tortfeasor is likely to be judged negligent, and on how the actions of the
tortfeasors combine to produce the harm. We show that in general, JSL is not eﬃcient when
there is uncertainty about negligence. Whether the optimal rule imposes more or less liability
than JSL depends on whether the actions of the tortfeasors are substitutes or complements
in the production of the harm. We argue that in many cases, JSL reform may improve
outcomes by giving parties who were previously unlikely to be sued greater incentive to take
care. This occurs because under JSL reform, parties who are sued have an incentive to bring
the other tortfeasors into court in order to show that these others are responsible for some
of the harm.
Our empirical results justify the theoretical focus on JSL reform, with its complex im-
plications for the incentives of multiple parties. Certainly, in the case of fatal accidents, the
eﬀects of JSL reform are more consistent across speciﬁcations, and seemingly more persis-
tent over time, than those of other prominent tort reforms, such as damage caps, which have
received more attention in the literature.
Our estimates suggest that JSL reform increases the level of care taken, so that the
incidence of fatal accidents is reduced. It is striking that we ﬁnd no eﬀects on deaths due
to overdoses or car accidents, two classes of accidental death that are less likely than others
23to be driven by developments in the tort system. The failure to ﬁnd an eﬀect in these
two classes of cases also indicates that accidental deaths are not declining because of better
medical care caused by JSL reforms, but because parties take more care to avoid accidents.
This is consistent with our result that the location of death (in or out of hospital) does not
signiﬁcantly change the estimated eﬀect of tort reform.
The primary beneﬁciaries of JSL reforms are the elderly, and many deaths are (or could
be) averted by JSL reform in this age group. A limitation of our empirical analysis is
that we look only at accident rates, whereas overall social eﬃciency will also depend on
what happens to court costs (Shavell (1982)), and uncertainty about expected court costs
(Craswell and Calfee, 1986). However, one aim of JSL reform is to reduce the incidence of
frivolous lawsuits against deep-pocketed defendants who have minimal responsibility for the
harms suﬀered by plaintiﬀs. To the extent that the law is successful in meeting this goal,
our estimates understate the potential gains to society from adopting JSL reforms.
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27Table 1: Percentage of Tort Suits Terminating in State Courts Naming Multiple Defendants
(for the 75 Largest Counties in the United States, 1992)
Premises Liability Suits:  
Percentage naming 1 defendant: 47.8%  
Percentage naming 2 defendants: 24.8%
Percentage naming 3 or more defendants:   27.4%
Product Liability Suits:  
Percentage naming 1 defendant: 32.2%
Percentage naming 2 defendants: 24.9%  
Percentage naming 3 or more defendants:   42.9%
"Miscellaneous" Tort Suits:  
Tort suits over accidental bodily injuries not sustained in automobile accidents, excluding
premises liability, product liability, or medical malpractice.
Percentage naming 1 defendant: 40.7%
Percentage naming 2 defendants: 32.1%
Percentage naming 3 or more defendants:   27.1%
Premises Liability, Product Liability, and Miscellaneous Tort Suits Together:  
Percentage naming 1 defendant: 45.3%
Percentage naming 2 defendants: 25.9%
Percentage naming 3 or more defendants:   28.8%
Source:  U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1995, "Tort Cases in Large Counties". 
Note:  The top 75 counties account for about half of all civil filings. 
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 Table 2: Summary of Enactment Dates of State JSL Reforms, 
1981-2004
 





1985 IN,   IA 
1986 AK,   CA,   UT,   WY 
1987 CO,   CT,   FL,   HI,   IL,    
MI,   NY,   SD,   WA 
1988 AZ,   GA,   ID,   LA,   MT,  
NV,   NJ,   ND,   OR,   TX  
1989 MN 
1990 MS,   NH 
1991











2003 AR,   PA 
2004
The law is entered as turning on during the first year in which it is in place for at least half the year.
29Table 3: Summary Statistics           
Variable Mean Standard Deviation
Accidental death rates, per 100,000:
   -all types of accidents 37.44 7.96
   -drug overdoses only 3.07 2.33
   -auto accidents only 17.36 5.17
   -excluding auto accidents
      and drug overdoses 17.01 3.90
          - pronounced dead outside of hospital  6.60 2.50
          - persons pronounced dead at hospitals,  10.39 2.32
Accidental death rates, per 100,000, by demographic group excluding overdoses and auto
  -Ages 0 to 5 10.84 4.20
  -Ages 6 to 17 4.84 2.22  
  -Ages 18 to 64 11.38 3.78
  -Ages 65 and Above 67.23 16.75
State-Year Level Controls:  
Unemployment Rate 6.17 1.95  
Real per Capital Personal Income ($2004) 28742 4741
Percent African-American 12.34 8.01
Percent Other Minority: 4.11 5.12
Percent Age 4 and Under 7.27 0.79
Percent Age 65 and Over 12.37 2.03
Percent Males Age 15 to 24 7.64 0.85
Per Capita Alcohol Consumption 2.35 0.43
Hospital Beds Per Capita 0.0045 0.0013
Note:  All values are for annual state-level observations from 1981 to 2004, weighted by state-year populations.
30Table 4:  Effects of JSL reform on Accidental Deaths
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Dependent Variable:  Excludes Auto Excludes Auto Excludes Auto Overdoses Only Overdoses Only Auto  Auto  Deaths Outside
Accidents and  Accidents and  Accidents and  Accidents Only Accidents Only Hospital, excluding
Overdoses Overdoses Overdoses Auto and Overdose
Variable
JSL Reform -0.0277** -0.0341** -0.0336** -0.0049 -0.0098 0.0157 0.022 -0.0440*
[0.0096] [0.0085] [0.0088] [0.0960] [0.0799] [0.0134] [0.0157] [0.0182]
Collateral Source Rule 0.0451** 0.0440** 0.0403 0.0271 0.0566**
   Reform [0.0081] [0.0089] [0.0700] [0.0166] [0.0158]
 
Non-Economic Damages -0.0027 -0.0024 -0.086 -0.0211 0.0011
   (NED) Cap [0.0123] [0.0124] [0.1300] [0.0159] [0.0143]
Punitive Damages -0.0162 -0.0155 -0.0617 -0.013 -0.0177
   Reform [0.0102] [0.0107] [0.0755] [0.0182] [0.0183]
NED Cap, Specific To 0.0046 -0.1529 0.0334 0.0023
   Medical Malpractice [0.0089] [0.1037] [0.0209] [0.0145]
Observations 1224 1224 1224 1223 1223 1224 1224 1224
R-squared 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.9 0.91 0.97 0.97 0.92
Notes:  Standard errors in brackets.  They are clustered at the state level.  A + indicates statistical significance
at 10%; * significance at 5%; ** significance at 1%.
All regressions also included the following control variables: % of state population <=4; % of state population >=65;
% state population who are males >14 and <25; % African-American; %other racial minorities; unemployment rate;
real per capita personal income; hospital beds per capita; per capita alcohol consumption; state-specific linear time trends; state-specific fixed effects; year effects.
31Table 5:  Estimates for Non-Auto, Non-Overdose Death Rates for Different Age Groups
Dependent Variable:  Accident Victims Accident Victims Accident Victims Accident Victims Accident Victims Accident Victims Accident Victims Accident Victims
Aged 0 to 5   Aged 0 to 5   Aged 6 to 17   Aged 6 to 17   Aged 18 to 64 Aged 18 to 64 Aged 65 and Up Aged 65 and Up
Variable
JSL Reform -0.0585* -0.0624* -0.0403 -0.0293 -0.0091 -0.0123 -0.0439** -0.0487**
[0.0263] [0.0308] [0.0326] [0.0369] [0.0124] [0.0136] [0.0124] [0.0139]
Collateral Source Rule 0.0452 0.0026 0.0193 0.0488*
   Reform [0.0405] [0.0459] [0.0120] [0.0219]
Non-Economic Damages -0.0188 -0.0125 -0.031 0.012
   (NED) Cap [0.0309] [0.0342] [0.0201] [0.0201]
Punitive Damages -0.0166 -0.0386 0.014 -0.0288
   Reform [0.0272] [0.0291] [0.0160] [0.0191]
NED Cap, Specific To -0.004 0.0215 0.0109 -0.0112
   Medical Malpractice [0.0549] [0.0357] [0.0090] [0.0134]
Observations 1224 1224 1224 1224 1224 1224 1224 1224
R-squared 0.83 0.83 0.85 0.85 0.94 0.94 0.92 0.92
Notes:  See Table 4.   
32Table 6:  Estimates Comparing the Effects of  "New" and "Old" JSL Reforms
Dependent Variable:  Log of Rate of Non-Auto Accidental Deaths, Omitting Overdoses.
   
X=2 X=3 X=4 X=5
Variable
JSL Reform,  -0.0209+ -0.0258* -0.0276** -0.0294**
    Enacted Within the Last _X_ Years [0.0117] [0.0100] [0.0095] [0.0093]
JSL Reform,  -0.0419** -0.0380* -0.0395* -0.0457**
    In Place for More than _X_ Years [0.0152] [0.0171] [0.0152] [0.0133]
Observations 1224 1224 1224 1224
R-squared 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95
Notes: See Table 4.    
A tort reform enacted within the last _X_ years was enacted in the current year t, year t-x+1, or any year in between t and t-x+1.  
A tort reform in place for more than _X_ years was enacted prior to year t-x+1.
 
33Table 7:  Estimated Effects of Leads of Tort Reform Variables
Dependent Variable:   Log of Rate of Non-Auto Accidental Deaths, Omitting Overdoses
Variable
JSL Reform -0.0304* -0.0370**
[0.0136] [0.0133]
2-Year Lead of Above  -0.0046 -0.0076
   Tort Reform Variable [0.0115] [0.0124]
Collateral Source Rule 0.0496**
   Reform [0.0146]
2-Year Lead of Above  0.0141
   Tort Reform Variable [0.0187]
Non-Economic Damages   -0.0015
   (NED) Cap [0.0108]
2-Year Lead of Above  0.0016
   Tort Reform Variable [0.0174]
Punitive Damages -0.0176
   Reform [0.0112]
2-Year Lead of Above  -0.0035
   Tort Reform Variable [0.0095]
NED Cap, Specific To 0.0033
   Medical Malpractice [0.0120]
2-Year Lead of Above  0.0023
   Tort Reform Variable [0.0185]
Observations 1224 1224
R-squared 0.95 0.95
Notes: See Table 4.
A 2-year lead of a tort reform variable is an indicator equal to 1 in the two years preceding the enactment 
of that type of tort reform and 0 otherwise.   
34Appendix Table 1: Summary of Changes in Other Major State Tort Reforms, 1981-2004




1983   IN* ( + )
1984
1985 ME* ( + ) , MT ( + )
1986 AK ( + ) AK ( + ) , WA ( + ) MO ( + ) , WV ( + ) , WI ( + )  SD ( + )
1987 AL ( + ) , CO^ ( + ) , FL ( + ) , IL ( + ) ,   CO ( + ), HI ( + ), MD ( + ), NH ( + ) AL ( + ), KS ( + ), MI ( + ) AK ( + ) , AZ* ( + ) , FL ( + ) , OK ( + )
MI ( + ) , MN ( + ) , NY ( + )
1988 CT ( + ) , GA ( + ) , IA ( + ) , MT ( + ) , ID ( + ), KS ( + ) , OR ( + ) FL ( + ), KS ( - ) , TX* ( - ) , UT ( + ) AL ( + ) , CA ( + ) , GA ( + ) , IA ( + ) , KS ( + ) , 
NJ ( + ) , OH ( + ) ND ( + ) , OH ( + ) , OR ( + ) , SC ( + ), TX ( + ) 
1989 KS ( + ) , KY ( + ) WA* ( - ) KY ( + ) , NV ( + ) , UT ( + ) , VA ( + )
1990 ID ( + )  HI* ( + )
1991 GA* ( - )  NH* ( - )
1992 AL* ( - ), OH* ( - ) MD* ( + ) , TN* ( + )
1993 KS* ( - ) 
1994 AZ ( + ) , OH* ( - ) MS ( + )
1995 AZ ( - ) , KY* ( - )  IL ( + ) IL ( + )
1996 MT ( + ) , ND ( + )  DC* ( + ) , NJ ( + ) , NC ( + )
1997 AL* ( - ) OH ( + ) MO* ( + )
1998 IL* ( - ) , OH* ( - ) IL* ( - )
1999
2000  OR* ( - )
2001 AL* ( + )
2002
2003 NV ( + ) , MS ( + ) , OH ( + ) AR ( + )
2004 OK ( + ) , TX ( + ) ID ( + )
"+" indicates that the law was turned on (was enacted), and "-" indicates that the law was turned off (struck down or repealed).  
"^" indicates that the CSR reform does not allow offsets of payments from private sources of collateral insurance
"*" along with "-" indicates that the law was found unconsitutional and reversed by the state Supreme Court.  
"*" along with "+" indicates that the law was enacted by a state Supreme Court's decision, rather than a state legislature's decision.  
The law is entered as turning on during the first year in which it is in place for at least half the year.
The law is entered as turning off for the first year in which it is no longer in place for at least half the year.
35Appendix Table 2:  Estimates Comparing "New" and "Old" Tort Reforms
Dependent Variable:  Log of Rate of Non-Auto Accidental Deaths, Omitting Overdoses
 
X=2 X=3 X=4 X=5
Variable
JSL Reform -0.0241* -0.0296** -0.0321** -0.0358**
    Enacted Within the Last _X_ Years [0.0104] [0.0095] [0.0089] [0.0089]
JSL Reform -0.0422** -0.0408** -0.0443** -0.0512**
    In Place for More than _X_ Years [0.0134] [0.0152] [0.0145] [0.0141]
Collateral Source Rule Reform 0.0444* 0.0470** 0.0474** 0.0487**
    Enacted Within the Last _X_ Years [0.0189] [0.0157] [0.0120] [0.0095]
Collateral Source Rule Reform 0.0382* 0.0352+ 0.0321+ 0.0207
    In Place for More than _X_ Years [0.0148] [0.0193] [0.0184] [0.0159]
Cap on Non-Economic Damages (NED) -0.001 -0.0132 -0.0082 -0.0065
    Enacted Within the Last _X_ Years [0.0103] [0.0097] [0.0106] [0.0097]
Cap on Non-Economic Damages -0.0078 0.0338* 0.0316* 0.0526*
    In Place for More than _X_ Years [0.0215] [0.0163] [0.0133] [0.0254]
Punitive Damages Reform -0.0117 -0.0131 -0.0136 -0.0163
    Enacted Within the Last _X_ Years [0.0106] [0.0107] [0.0103] [0.0101]
Punitive Damages Reform -0.0108 -0.0127 -0.0166 -0.0271+
    In Place for More than _X_ Years [0.0169] [0.0175] [0.0164] [0.0157]
Cap on NED, Specific to Malpractice -0.0179 -0.012 -0.0064 -0.002
    Enacted Within the Last _X_ Years [0.0126] [0.0106] [0.0093] [0.0078]
Cap on NED, Specific to Malpractice 0.0272+ 0.0244 0.0206+ 0.0139
    In Place for More than _X_ Years [0.0139] [0.0147] [0.0111] [0.0131]
Observations 1224 1224 1224 1224
R-squared 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95
Notes: See Table 4.    
A tort reform enacted within the last _X_ years was enacted in the current year t, year t-x+1, or any year in between t and t-x+1.  
A tort reform in place for more than _X_ years was enacted prior to year t-x+1.
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Figure 2:  Accidental Death Rates by Demographic Group
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